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If you want to sell an aviation-related item or aircraft, post it in. • The moderators have the final say in disputes. Info and FAQs • • Updated daily from flair; see for requests/issues. • You will find many answers to questions you may have, such as how to become a pilot. Pilot Certificate Badges • SIM - Simulators only, or pre-student interest • ST - Student • SPT - Sport Pilot • UPL - Ultralight Pilot (EASA) • RPL - Recreational Pilot • LAPL - Light Aircraft Pilot (EASA) • PPL - Private Pilot • CPL - Commercial Pilot • ATP - Airline Transport Pilot • CFI - FAA Certified Flight Instructor • FI - Flight Instructor (non-FAA Country) • MIL - AF,N,A - Military pilot, AF, N, A, etc. As a reference, it's good for pretty much everything exept weight and balance calculations.

You should use the numbers that are in the AFM that stays with the plane, because they're the most accurate. They take into account recent measurements for that specific plane, while a POH will just give you factory standard numbers. You can use the POH for rough calculations as long as your plane doesn't have some weird modifications that throw the empty CG off, but for accuracy and legality you need to use the tail-number-specific numbers from the AFM. For older aircraft that don't have an AFM, you should still look into its records and find the latest W&B numbers and use those. Don't just use the POH numbers on good faith. I believe my plane currently weighs 50-75 pounds more than the factory POH numbers.

Just make sure you're using an official AFM when you do this for your checkride. It's a recipe for a failure if you can't show that your W&B calculations are spot-on legit. I had to show the DPE exactly where I got every figure. You can learn to do W&B with unofficial stuff like a standard POH for your model, but every single plane (literally every single individual plane) has a slightly different weight and CG because they all have slightly different equipment that weighs slightly different amounts. The MX crews are required to keep a running log of every single modification made to the plane (along with other maintenance logs), and you need to be using those official weight logs.

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It might seem silly & pedantic, but there have been in the past where people were 'close' on their W&B calculations, only to find that 'close' doesn't help you when you discover that you don't have enough elevator authority to get back to level after takeoff due to your CG being too far aft, especially if you're unlucky and your elevator rigging is slightly out of specification.

C-FAXO (FAXO) departed Lloyd Lake, Saskatchewan, with only the pilot on board at 1843. Once airborne, FAXO proceeded direct to CYMM, climbing to an altitude of 4400 feet above sea level (asl). A direct route from Lloyd Lake to CYMM is approximately 82 nm. At 1849:11, FAXO appeared on radar 77 nm northeast (045°) from CYMM, climbing through 3600 feet asl with a ground speed of 130 knots.

At 1915:21, FAXO entered the northeast corner of the practice area, descending out of 4000 feet asl (). At 1916:44, GJSE was 1.8 nm from FAXO, climbing through 2200 feet asl at 80 knots (). At 1917:05, GJSE turned left and crossed in front of FAXO at a distance of 0.8 nm. At 1917:34, FAXO made contact with CYMM tower, and was assigned a transponder code. At the time of that communication, GJSE momentarily paralleled FAXO's track in a southwesterly direction, as the aircraft continued in a gradual left-hand turn.

FAXO's ground speed was greater, and the aircraft was overtaking GJSE. At 1917:42, the CYMM tower controller advised the pilot of FAXO that there was a Cessna 172 in the area. At 1917:53, the 2 aircraft collided.

GJSE broke up in flight due to collision forces and fell to the ground. Both of GJSE's occupants were fatally injured.

The floats were dislodged from FAXO, with the left float separating completely. The right float remained attached but folded against the fuselage.

At 1918:34, the pilot of FAXO advised the CYMM tower controller of the collision. The pilot of FAXO was able to maintain 80 knots, and made a plan to land on the grass infield at CYMM. The CYMM tower controller mobilized aircraft rescue and fire-fighting (ARFF), which was standing by when FAXO arrived. The aircraft landed on the grass to the north of Runway 25 at the east end. The aircraft was set down on its belly, which resulted in a propeller strike. 18 Wheels Of Steel American Long Haul Serial Keygen Ulead. The right wing strut failed on landing, causing the wing to collapse.

The fuel tank ruptured on the left wing, but there was no post-impact fire. The pilot turned off all switches except for the auxiliary fuel pump and the avionics master.

He then evacuated the aircraft with no injuries and was met by ARFF personnel. ARFF worked together with airport staff to contain the fuel leak, and secured the crash site. Communications The pilot of FAXO was tuned to 126.7 megahertz (MHz) and made a position report while en route prior to entering the practice area. Approximately 30 nm northeast of CYMM, after receiving ATIS (automatic terminal information service) information November, the pilot switched to CYMM tower frequency of 118.1 MHz. The primary radio on GJSE was destroyed; the secondary radio was tuned to the North Oil Sands air traffic frequency of 123.5 MHz. The standard practice for McMurray Aviation training aircraft was to monitor 126.7 MHz in the northeast practice area. There was no recording available that monitored 126.7 MHz.

The investigation determined that communications were not established between the 2 aircraft. It is unknown whether the instructor or student pilot in GJSE heard the position report made by the pilot of FAXO. Aircraft impact and breakup sequence Scratch marks, impact damage, and paint transfers observed on the wreckage are consistent with the floats of FAXO coming into contact with and separating the left wing of GJSE, followed by the cabin, empennage, and right wing.

During the collision sequence, the left wingtip fuel tank extension and left float of FAXO separated; they were found in the debris field of GJSE. There were no other indications of collision on the fuselage, empennage, or wings of FAXO. Aircraft A review of the aircraft records indicates that both aircraft were certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with the existing regulations and approved procedures. GJSE was white with green markings, and FAXO was white with blue markings. Both aircraft were high-wing aircraft, and both were equipped with functioning mode C transponders. Nothing was found to indicate that there was any airframe failure or system malfunction before or during the flight. All control surfaces were accounted for, and all damage to both aircraft was attributable to impact forces.

The investigation determined there were no devices limiting the field of view or simulating instrument meteorological conditions in use by either pilot. The severity of damage to GJSE prevented investigators from determining whether landing lights were used for conspicuity. There was no strobe light system installed in GJSE, nor was it required by regulation. GJSE was equipped with beacon and navigation lights. According to the McMurray Aviation Cessna 172 checklist, it was required to turn the beacon light on.

FAXO was equipped with beacon, navigation, and wingtip strobe lights. It was the pilot's practice to fly with all of these lights on. Weather The reported weather for CYMM at 2000 was winds 260° true (T) at 8 knots, visibility 9 statute miles, broken cloud layers based at 7500 feet above ground level (agl), 9000 feet agl, and a third layer at 12 000 feet agl.

The temperature was 20°C, the dew point was 8°C, and the altimeter setting was 29.80 inches of mercury. The collision took place roughly 3 hours before sunset in overcast conditions and good visibility. Weather and sun position were not considered factors in this accident.

Flight crew qualifications Pilot-in-command/ Instructor: C-GJSE The instructor held a current commercial pilot licence for single-engine landplanes issued by Transport Canada (TC) and an instructor rating that had been upgraded to Class 3 on 19 February 2015. His total time, not including the accident flight, was 856.4 hours, of which 626.4 hours were in the employ of McMurray Aviation. His medical certificate was current at the time of the accident. Eyeglasses or contact lenses were required to be worn.

The investigation was unable to determine whether the instructor was wearing either at the time of the accident. It is unknown exactly when the instructor arrived at the hangar; however, the standard practice was for company instructors to arrive 45 to 60 minutes before their first scheduled flight. Therefore, at the time of the 1800 departure for the training flight, the instructor had been on duty for approximately 11 hours. In the previous 7 days, the instructor had accomplished 7.8 hours of flight instruction. The investigation was unable to determine the quality and quantity of sleep obtained by the instructor. Based on the work schedule, fatigue was not considered a factor.

Student: C-GJSE The student was new to McMurray Aviation and had received only 3 hours of flight instruction before the accident flight. At the time of the accident, a TC student pilot permit had not been issued, nor was it required by regulation. Pilot-in-command: C-FAXO The pilot of FAXO held a private pilot licence for single-engine landplanes and seaplanes. The pilot started flying in 1998 and, at the time of the accident, had accumulated 1700 total flight hours. On 14 July 2008, the pilot obtained a floatplane endorsement. At the time of the accident, the pilot had accumulated approximately 330 flight hours on FAXO. The pilot had last flown FAXO on 31 May 2015 and met TC recency requirements.

The pilot's medical certificate was current at the time of the accident. He was required to wear eyeglasses or contact lenses, and was wearing eyeglasses at the time of the accident. The pilot of FAXO had just ended a period of 5 days off at home. The pilot departed Parkland Aerodrome (CPL6) at noon and flew 1 hour and 15 minutes to CYMM in a personal Piper PA-28 Arrow. The pilot then transitioned to FAXO for the 55-minute flight to Lloyd Lake to visit friends.

Upon finding no one at the lake property, the pilot flew back toward CYMM. Fatigue was not considered a factor for this pilot in the accident. Airspace The collision happened in Class G uncontrolled airspace at 2800 feet asl.

This uncontrolled airspace lies underneath a Class E control area extension based at 3500 feet asl. A Class E terminal area (controlled airspace) surrounds CYMM from 700 feet agl up to 12 500 feet asl (). The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) states: Class E airspace is designated where an operational need exists for controlled airspace but does not meet the requirements for Class A, B, C, or D. Operations may be conducted under IFR or VFR.

ATC [air traffic control] separation is provided only to aircraft operating under IFR. There are no special requirements for VFR. Aircraft are required to be equipped with a transponder and automatic pressure altitude equipment to operate in Class E airspace that is specified as transponder airspace. [see RAC 1.9.2] Low level airways, control area extensions, transition areas, or control zones established without an operating control tower may be classified as Class E airspace.

In addition, the AIM states: Class G airspace is airspace that has not been designated Class A, B, C, D, E or F, and within which ATC has neither the authority nor the responsibility to exercise control over air traffic. However, ATS units do provide flight information and alerting services. The alerting service will automatically alert SAR authorities once an aircraft becomes overdue, which is normally determined from data contained in the flight plan or flight itinerary. In effect, Class G is all uncontrolled domestic airspace.

Practice area The practice area northeast of CYMM is not a designated advisory area. Before 2006, McMurray Aviation's flight training unit (FTU) had its students and instructors practise to the west of CYMM. However, this practice area was in the middle of a very busy corridor between Edmonton and the airports located among the various oil sands projects. Following discussions between the FTU and the NAV CANADA Flight Service Station in late 2009, it was agreed that the FTU practice area would move to its current location northeast of CYMM.

The current area was well known to pilots who operated regularly out of CYMM, including the pilot of FAXO, who received his flight training in the current practice area. According to the Designated Airspace Handbook, an advisory area is “airspace of defined dimensions within which a high volume of pilot training or an unusual type of aerial activity may be carried out.” If it is determined that an area will have a high volume of pilot training or an unusual type of aerial activity, an advisory area can be established either permanently or by NOTAM (notice to airmen). A Class F Special Use Advisory Airspace (CYA) has defined dimensions, and can have restricted times, altitudes, frequencies, and entry restrictions. A CYA is displayed on all published maps, is known to ATC, and can be depicted on the controller's radar displays.

The flight training practice area was not depicted on the visual navigation chart or the VFR terminal procedures chart (VTPC) in section B of the Canada Flight Supplement, but was depicted in the Fort Mackay VTPC, though not designated an advisory area. The VTPC also depicts VFR routes. Although not required by the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs), the routes provide for a safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of traffic to and from the airport. Fort McMurray tower operations The CYMM control tower operates between 0615 and 2245. The Class C airport control zone centred on the CYMM airport has a radius of 5 nm, in accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization standards, and radar service is provided within that area.

Within the control zone, safety alerts can be issued to VFR aircraft on a workload, time-available basis. The accident took place in Class G uncontrolled airspace. Although the NAV CANADA radar had the capability to see beyond the flight training practice area, and the controller could see the aircraft on the radar, the controller was only required/responsible to provide radar service in the 5 nm control zone at the CYMM airport. Services provided by the tower controller to VFR aircraft outside of the control zone are advisory in nature only and are dependent on controller workload. At the time of the occurrence, the controller on duty was working both the tower and ground controller positions. In the 13 minutes preceding the collision, the controller answered 7 calls on ground frequency and 12 calls on tower frequency. As a result, the controller's primary focus was on controlling the aircraft within the control zone.

There was a second controller on duty who was not in the tower cab at the time of the occurrence. The Fort McMurray Unit Operations Manual allows the combining of air and ground control positions for meal and relief breaks.

After the collision, the second controller was called to the tower cab to assist. The duty controller was licensed and had a current medical certificate.

In the previous 7 days, the controller had 1 day off 5 days before the accident. In the 4 days before the accident, all shifts started in the early afternoon. Controller fatigue was not considered to be a factor in this accident. McMurray Aviation McMurray Aviation, which began operations in 1984, holds a CARs Subpart 406 FTU Air Operator Certificate issued by TC. It also holds CARs Subpart 702 and CARs Subpart 703 commercial Air Operator Certificates.

McMurray Aviation operates a fleet of 12 aircraft that provide air charter, cargo, and pilot training services. The primary training aircraft is the Cessna 172.

Limitations of the see-and-avoid principle The see-and-avoid principle is based on active scanning, and the ability to detect conflicting aircraft and to take appropriate measures to avoid such aircraft. TSB aviation investigation reports A12H0001 and A12C0053 addressed the limitations, previously established in a 1991 Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) study, of the see-and-avoid principle for preventing mid-air collisions between VFR aircraft. The ATSB study presented the following summary, which is consistent with known physiological limitations of human vision: Cockpit workload and other factors reduce the time that pilots spend in traffic scans. However, even when pilots are looking out, there is no guarantee that other aircraft will be sighted. Most cockpit windscreen configurations severely limit the view available to the pilot. The available view is frequently interrupted by obstructions such as window-posts which totally obscure some parts of the view and make other areas visible to only one eye.

Window-posts, windscreen crazing and dirt can act as ‘focal traps' and cause the pilot to involuntarily focus at a very short distance even when attempting to scan for traffic. Direct glare from the sun and veiling glare reflected from windscreens can effectively mask some areas of the view. Visual scanning involves moving the eyes in order to bring successive areas of the visual field onto the small area of sharp vision in the centre of the eye. The process is frequently unsystematic and may leave large areas of the field of view unsearched. However, a thorough, systematic search is not a solution as in most cases it would take an impractical amount of time. The physical limitations of the human eye are such that even the most careful search does not guarantee that traffic will be sighted. A significant proportion of the view may be masked by the blind spot in the eye, the eyes may focus at an inappropriate distance due to the effect of obstructions as outlined above or due to empty field myopia in which, in the absence of visual cues, the eyes focus at a resting distance of around half a metre.

An object which is smaller than the eye's acuity threshold is unlikely to be detected and even less likely to be identified as an approaching aircraft. The pilot's functional visual field contracts under conditions of stress or increased workload. The resulting ‘tunnel vision' reduces the chance that an approaching aircraft will be seen in peripheral vision.

The human visual system is better at detecting moving targets than stationary targets, yet in most cases, an aircraft on a collision course appears as a stationary target in the pilot's visual field. The contrast between an aircraft and its background can be significantly reduced by atmospheric effects, even in conditions of good visibility. An approaching aircraft, in many cases, presents a very small visual angle until a short time before impact. In addition, complex backgrounds such as ground features or clouds hamper the identification of aircraft via a visual effect known as ‘contour interaction'. This occurs when background contours interact with the form of the aircraft, producing a less distinct image. Even when an approaching aircraft has been sighted, there is no guarantee that evasive action will be successful.

It takes a significant amount of time to recognise and respond to a collision threat and an inappropriate evasive manoeuvre may serve to increase rather than decrease the chance of a collision. During instructional training flights, there are added distractions that contribute to the limitations of the see-and-avoid principle. Free Download Lagu Dangdut Koplo Kereta Malam Soimah here.

The TC Flight Instructor Guide emphasizes throughout that instructors should be cognizant that teaching duties can detract from maintaining an effective lookout for traffic. Airborne collision avoidance systems Neither aircraft was equipped with any type of aircraft collision avoidance system technology, nor was it required by regulation.

The TSB issued a safety concern in its Aviation Investigation Report A12H0001, which discussed the need for the see-and-avoid concept to be enhanced by aircraft collision avoidance technology. In part, it states: This accident has demonstrated yet again that relying solely on the see-and-avoid principle to avoid collisions between aircraft operating under visual flight rules (VFR) in congested airspace is inadequate. A number of international studies have addressed the overall issue of the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle, as well as the risks of collision associated with this principle. Footnotes Footnote 1 All times are Mountain Daylight Time (Coordinated Universal Time minus 6 hours). Footnote 2 A transponder is an automatic receiver and transmitter that can receive a signal (be interrogated) from a radar station and then send a reply back to a radar station. McKinley, and R.D. Bent, Aircraft Electricity and Electronics (Aviation technology series) (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989).

Footnote 3 Transport Canada, Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433, section 401.05. Footnote 4 Transport Canada, TP 14371E, Aeronautical Information Manual, section RAC 2.8.5. Footnote 5 Ibid., RAC 2.8.7. Footnote 6 NAV CANADA, Designated Airspace Handbook, Issue 252, EFF 15 October 2015. Footnote 7 Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle (1991), available at (last accessed on 8 September 2016). Footnote 8 Ibid. Footnote 9 Transport Canada, TP 975E, Flight Instructor Guide – Aeroplane, 2004.

Footnote 10 W. Graham, See and Avoid/Cockpit Visibility, FAA Report DOT/FAA/CT-TN89/18 (October 1989), as quoted in Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report A12H0001: Mid-air collision between Beechcraft V35B, N6658R and Piper PA-28-140, N23SC, Warrenton, Virginia, 6 nm S (28 May 2012). Footnote 11 K.W. Dodhia, and R.K.

Dismukes, “Is Pilots’ Visual Scanning Adequate to Avoid Mid-air Collisions?” Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Oklahoma City (2005), pp. 104–109, as quoted in Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report A12H0001: Mid-air collision between Beechcraft V35B, N6658R and Piper PA-28-140, N23SC, Warrenton, Virginia, 6 nm S (28 May 2012). Footnote 12 J.W.

Chappelow and A.J. Belyavin, Random Mid-Air Collisions in the Low Flying System, Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine Report 702 (April 1991), as cited in in Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report A12H0001: Mid-air collision between Beechcraft V35B, N6658R and Piper PA-28-140, N23SC, Warrenton, Virginia, 6 nm S (28 May 2012). Footnote 13 Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Aviation Investigation Report A12H0001: Mid-air collision between Beechcraft V35B, N6658R and Piper PA-28-140, N23SC, Warrenton, Virginia, 6 nm S (28 May 2012). Date modified: 2016-10-20.